Financial crisis risk is now firmly in the spotlight after a turbulent past quarter century bore witness to a number of market events previously thought to be once-ina-lifetime occurrences. The apparent inability of risk models to deal with real world financial markets produced a whole line of popular books decrying unrealistic assumptions behind the extended CAPM-type models, especially the bell curve assumption. We closely examine the old paradigm and present evidence which clearly shows that this focus on the distributional axioms is misguided and that the main deficiency of the old paradigm lies elsewhere, namely in equating risk with presently observed volatility. We present a new approach to forecasting risks and thoroughly examine its performance and implications over a number of crisis events in the past 25 years, while comparing it to traditional methods. Our approach, which is based on the assessment of risk-taking behavior of market participants in the endogenous risk framework, dominates alternative methods of risk estimation, while still allowing finance professionals to utilize familiar risk metrics like Tracking Error and Value-at-Risk.
The New Paradigm of Risk Management 1
How does one measure risk? What does it mean to forecast risk? Is the future going to resemble the past, and if so, how?
These questions, far from being the exclusive province of bona fide philosophers, are actually something that people answer through their actions every day. They are particularly relevant for practitioners of finance and financial risk, who must implicitly answer them every time they use 'a risk model'. The old paradigm of risk management had given what appeared to be plausible answers to those questions.
The Old Paradigm
Unfortunately, the answers given are thoroughly embedded in the physics-inspired view of the financial economy as a stable and an equilibrium seeking system. In such a view, if some changes do occur in the financial markets, those changes present no discontinuities and the model has ample time to react by slowly adjusting risk forecasts as the volatility rises. As almost everybody in the world by now knows, currently accepted risk models have time and again shown their inability to deal with financial market reality. Frequent talk of 'hundred year floods' and of 'rise in correlations' not only suggests frequent failures of a theory, but also the inability of the theory to learn from past mistakes by incorporating new data. The crash of 2008, completely unforeseen by all traditional risk systems, should serve as the final wake-up call to re-examine the foundations of the old paradigm and consider how sound they really are.
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) started with the work of Harry Markowitz and is based on a number of fairly elaborate assumptions regarding financial markets. MPT's dominance of the portfolio management and reporting resembles the use of Newtonian mechanics in building of the automobiles. Not surprisingly, MPT comes under detailed scrutiny every time a supposed once-in-a-lifetime event occurs in the financial markets. It is the unrealistic assumption set underlying the MPT that usually bears the brunt of each failure in the eyes of investing public; this is particularly true for a bell curve distribution axiom. Only a lazy critic, not excluding us, has not knocked the bell curve for its lack of fat 1 About the author: Daniel Satchkov, CFA is the President and Head of Research at RiXtrema Inc., a risk modeling and consulting firm that focuses on the extreme financial market events. Prior to founding Rixtrema, he was an Associate Director of Risk Research at FactSet, where he was responsible for researching and developing software products in the areas of risk measurement and risk reporting. He spoke at numerous financial conferences on topics of extreme event risk and published articles dealing with risk management issues in such magazines as Journal of Asset Management, Investment and Pensions Europe, as well as in a number of whitepapers and an E-book. Daniel's current research is in the areas of extreme market events, credit cycles and behavioral finance. tails. However, upon close examination, we will come to the paradoxical conclusion that, despite the basic correctness of the assessment, first made by Benoit Mandelbrot (1963) , regarding the presence of fat tails in the financial markets, the inappropriateness of the bell curve is really one of the least important problems in the old paradigm. To get at the roots of the problem, we must go back to Barr Rosenberg (1973) , the father of all present day risk modeling. In his significantly titled "Prediction of Systemic and Specific Risk in Common Stocks" paper, he started with these momentous words: "Ex Ante predictions of the riskiness of common stocks -or, in more general terms, predictions of probability of returns can be based on fundamental (accounting) data for the firm and also on the previous history of stock prices." The discussion of questions that this little paragraph appears to have so impressively and easily settled could have filled volumes, and the empirical results appeared solid enough for widespread acceptance. Why were the results so good, given what we now know about the performance of the CAPM based risk models? We believe that the key reason for acceptance of Rosenberg's paradigm and its MPT foundations, was the particular sample that he used for testing , the years from 1954 to 1970. This happened to be one of the most tranquil periods in the history of stocks, the standard deviation of the daily returns of S&P 500 over this period was meager -around .66% (annualized volatility of 10.46%), while the same daily standard deviation since that time was much higher at 1.08% (annualized volatility of 17.1%). The standard deviation of S&P 500 from 1928 to 1954 was even higher at 1.47% (annualized volatility of 23.2%). Another and perhaps a more illuminating way of looking at this issue is to count the number of days when S&P 500 was down more than 3.5 % 2 . For the sixteen year period between 1954 and 1970 the number of days with a return below 3.5% was only 3 (!). For the prior sixteen years, namely between 1938 and 1954, the number of such days was 24, eight times higher. Meanwhile, the last sixteen years between 1994 and 2010 have produced 35 such days. Rosenberg was not the only one who developed his ideas during a period of stable economic growth and absence of major systemic risks. As Peter Bernstein (2007) , himself an ardent proponent of efficient markets, notes, all of the key pillars of Modern Portfolio Theory were put in place between 1951 and 1973. Surely, in such a calm environment as 1950's and 1960's the financial markets may appear continuous and recent historical returns are really all you need to forecast risk. Thus, much of the groundwork of the MPT risk modeling was laid during the period of unusually low risks and this fact has to be kept in mind by anyone wanting to understand the roots of the problem.
Key Conclusions of the Old Paradigm
Some modifications were later introduced, but the key conclusions regarding modeling of risk held up. They can be summarized thus -to forecast risk we only need to know past volatility of factors and individual assets plus the characteristics of those assets. In other words, the implicit assumption of the old paradigm is that volatility of future returns is a mirror of the volatility of past returns; that there are no discontinuities or sudden jumps in volatilities. This ultimately means that low volatility of actual returns will ALWAYS produce low volatility estimates, as it happened, for example in 2007 and even 2008. The problem we are pointing out is known and resurfaces after every crisis, as it did in January of 2009 when Basel Committee said: "Most risk management models, including stress tests, use historical statistical relationships to assess risk. They assume that risk is driven by a known and constant statistical process… Given a long period of stability, backward-looking historical information indicated benign conditions so that these models did not pick up the possibility of severe shocks or the buildup of vulnerabilities within the system". Regarding this quote it might be said that 'better late than never', except that even this stark admission seems to be all too frequently ignored when firms try to improve risk management processes using the same old foundation.
The only non-minor addition to Rosenberg's framework was the introduction of the exponential decay weighting, prompted by a few brushes with post 1960's reality. After some unanticipated spikes in volatility a reasonable question arose about whether something that happened a year ago is of much relevance today at the moment when panic grips the market. An ad hoc adjustment was introduced to make the model more sensitive to those sharp changes and an exponential time decay rate became the staple of risk modeling. The goal of the decay rate was to assign more importance to recent observations than to the older ones. It is clear that the underlying assumption at work in the time decay adjustment is that the system being modeled is changing and the model needs to catch up quicker. Here is how it was a put in a pioneering RiskMetrics (1996) risk technical document:
"One way to capture the dynamic features of volatility is to use an exponential moving average of historical observations where the latest observations carry the highest weight in the volatility estimate. This approach has two important advantages over the equally weighted model. First, volatility reacts faster to shocks in the market as recent data carry more weight than data in the distant past. Second, following a shock (a large return), the volatility declines exponentially as the weight of the shock observation falls."
The choice of the decay rate is usually dictated by a number of considerations, some empiric and some statistical. Taking Barr Rosenberg's foundation and adding some features to account for the dynamic features of volatility really brings us to the way that virtually all of risk modeling is done today. Estimated risk is always a function of actual volatility over some recent period, which can be as short as one year or as long as five years. Exponential decay exists to make sure that models react faster to shocks 3 in the market.
Usefulness of the Old Paradigm Risk Modeling
Given all this, the real question is, can a model that simply reflects the market and "reacts" to shocks, rather than trying to anticipate them, give a useful forecast? If the model is not meant to even attempt an early warning and will tell you that risk is high only after even the casual observer realizes as much, how helpful can it really be? Consider Exhibit 1 as an example. The X-Axis is time and Y-Axis is return. The series are comprised of actual daily returns for the S&P 500 and Value-at-Risk in percent (this is consistent for all graphs in this document) under different methods of forecasting. We have included samples of two accepted methods for calculating risk, called the Equal Weighted (EW) and the Decay Time Weighted (DTW). The risk is defined here as 99% VaR, though our discussion broadly applies to other measures, such as tracking error. The purple bars are the daily returns of the S&P 500 and the blue dotted line is the EW 99% VaR, while the red dashed line is the DTW 99% VaR.
Exhibit 1 -Currently accepted methods in a run up to the 2008 Crash
A picture is worth a thousand words and this one doesn't require too much elaboration, especially since risk practitioners experienced it firsthand. Because the stock market volatility was not especially high in a run-up to the crash, the crash itself was a tremendous surprise for both traditional models, with DTW model reacting to the crash considerably quicker, just as intended. One model (DTW) reacts after the crash has already commenced, while the other one barely reacts at all (EW). We have used the best performing DTW model with a decay constant of .94. Other specifications have performed even poorer over the past 20+ years.
Attempts at Fixing the Old Paradigm

Fat Tails
There have been numerous attempts to improve on the various aspects of MPT based risk modeling. One of those attempts that received most public attention is the use of the so-called 'fat tail' distributions. As famously argued by Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007) in his best-selling "Black Swan: The Impact of Highly Improbable", normal distribution does not have enough room in its tails to accommodate extreme events. Taleb, following in the footsteps of the brilliant Benoit Mandelbrot, suggested using distributions in which the probability of the extreme event declines much slower as one gets away from the center of the distribution. There is a whole class of distributions called power law distributions which Taleb advocates in his intellectually stimulating book. For an in-depth treatment of many novel aspects of fat tail distributions, please also see Rachev et al (2005) . Can fat tail distributions be the answer to the deficiencies of the old paradigm? As we have suggested above, they cannot, simply because the problem with the old paradigm lies mainly outside of its distributional assumptions. The issue is that under the existing framework low market volatility will ALWAYS produce a low risk forecast, no matter which distribution is applied to the data. In statistics this is known as the GIGO problem (garbage-in-garbage-out) and it is not solved by any level of mathematical wizardry, but only by a paradigm shift. Exhibit 2 vividly confirms this. We created fat tail 99% VaR estimates using a quintessential power law distribution in finance, called the Student T distribution. The result is much the same as in Exhibit 1 under the bell curve, the model is surprised despite its fat tail capability.
Exhibit 2 -Fat tail (Student T distributions) in the run up to the 2008 crash
Market Implied VaR
It is sometimes suggested that present day modeling can be drastically improved by inclusion of market implied metrics to scale the volatility upward and thus anticipate crises. A particular version of this view applied to equity markets is based on a belief that professional traders know or suspect when a drastic reversal may be at hand and raise the price that they charge for writing options on the S&P 500 index, particularly put options. This idea has its share of contradictions, but we will not discuss them here.
Instead, we will again use the crisis of 2008 as our test case. Exhibit 3 shows the familiar 99% VaR now calculated based on the VIX (index of option implied at-the-money volatility of the S&P 500).
Exhibit 3 -VIX implied 99% VaR in the run up to the 2008 Crash
Exhibit 3 makes it clear that VIX does not possess any 'early warning' properties of the sort that would allow it to significantly improve the old paradigm. It reacts to the change, just like the DTW method does, with a complete surprise.
The New Paradigm
To proceed further we must identify some theoretical framework that resembles reality to a greater degree than the abovementioned assumptions of a relatively stable "equilibrium" state. There are a number of economic approaches that can be helpful in this regard. De Long et al (1990) show a model of market bubbles in which rational traders who follow positive-feedback strategies are buying with rising prices and selling with falling prices, thus producing self-sustaining trends which ultimately end in a crash. The situation of demand rising with the price not infrequently encountered in financial markets upsets traditional supply-demand relationships and makes traditional equilibrium approaches incapable of dealing with the real world fluctuations. De Long's model formalizes a permanent theme in the literature on self-reinforcing bubbles which goes back as far as Bagehot (1872) . Going further, Hyman Minsky (1992) identified the key features of the credit cycle which tend to drive large boom-bust sequences. According to the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), fundamental relationships in the real economy and financial markets change with the change in the behavior of the participants and particularly with the change in the behavior of the financial intermediaries. For example, after a period of prosperity, an increase in the risk-taking activities takes place and rising leverage builds setting up the potential for a violent downturn. Some interruption will expose the unsustainability of leverage levels leading to a credit contraction and a potential collapse in the asset values.
Minsky (1992) summarized his insights in two theorems of the Financial Instability:
"The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable and financing regimes in which it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system." Soros (1987) extensively discusses his view of boom-bust sequences. His description, though less rigorous than Minsky's, gives a useful view into the mechanism of self-sustaining bubbles via the mechanism he calls "reflexivity". Economy can deviate very far from a theoretical equilibrium for long periods of time, because many so-called 'fundamentals' under certain conditions can become highly intertwined with prices, which are supposed to reflect them. The views of both Minsky and Soros explain how the risk gets built up to an extremely high level due to purely endogenous market forces. The stage is then set for a dramatic reversal. In an exceptionally lucid explanation of systemic risk, Danielsson and Shin (2003) write, "One of the implications of a highly leveraged market going into reversal is that a moderate fall in asset value is highly unlikely. Either the asset does not fall in value at all, or the value falls by a large amount." We are basing our modeling approach on the views of abovementioned thinkers, as well as our own research. To summarize new paradigm thinking, we can say that the economy is a system that can generate endogenous risk under certain conditions and that those conditions are quantifiable in a risk model framework. To achieve that quantification we need to step outside of the MPT framework and allow for endogenous risk factors to affect every factor in the basic CAPM-like model 4 . In such a scenario, lower volatility may or may not lead to a low risk forecast and under certain conditions the risk can be quite high, despite tranquility in the markets. Broadly speaking, RiXtrema risk models will raise the initial forecast derived from a standard factor risk model if certain conditions embedded in RiXtrema risk models are satisfied. These conditions vary from market to market, but roughly can be understood as follows. As argued by Satchkov (2010) , the risk forecast from a traditional model needs to be adjusted upward when: a. Risk is mispriced for a period of time b. The trend of worsening risk mispricing stops and shows signs of reversal Risk mispricing can potentially be measured by a variety of more or less easily observed metrics. In this class of metrics we include junk credit spreads, housing price to rent ratios, sovereign spreads, price to earnings ratios, financial sector leverage, international debt and capital flow patterns and others. Let us consider some empirical examples of the performance of RiXtrema model relative to the old paradigm models. Exhibit 4 explores a familiar situation of a run up to the 2008 crash.
Crash in US Equity
Exhibit 4 -Comparison of risk forecasting methods in the run up to the 2008 crash Exhibit 4 is essentially Exhibt 1 with the RiXtrema estimated VaR added. As we already discussed, methods based on forecasting risk exclusively from observed volatility have fared badly. But the RiXtrema method (denoted XTRM in a green line) has given clear warning of increased risk in July of 2007. This forecast of increased risk of a loss has persisted all the way through the crash. Note that RiXtrema model has not reacted to the crash as violently as the DTW method, simply because the model was already 'aware' of the potential for the instability and actual market volatility, though important, was not a surprise that it was to the old paradigm methods. Now let us consider some samples from other periods and other markets.
LTCM Crash of 1998
In the next graph we will examine the credit crunch of 1998, commonly known as the LTCM Crash. We can see that a similar situation repeats itself; EW method hardly reacts; DTW method actually shows a decrease in risk just prior to the crash; RiXtrema VaR gives early warning of the rising potential for instability as early as end of 1997. It is important to note that the spike in volatility that resulted from the fallout of the Asian Currency Crisis toward the end of 1997 has also temporarily raised the risk forecast of the traditional DTW method. However, and this most vividly illustrates the difference of our approach, once the actual brief volatility spike has subsided, the DTW method quickly began forecasting lower risk, while RiXtrema risk forecast (which uses actual volatility as only one of the inputs and will override it given certain conditions) remained high, indicating high potential for instability all the way up to the LTCM Crash.
Exhibit 5 -Comparison of risk forecasting methods in the run up to the LTCM Crash
The Dot Com Meltdown
Another serious market reversal that we have witnessed fairly recently was the Dot Com Meltdown, which started in earnest in April of 2000.
Exhibit 6 -Comparison of risk forecasting methods in the run up to the dot com meltdown Exhibit 6 clearly shows the same problems with existing methods, they were both fooled by the 'lull before the storm'. DTW method even reduced the 99% VaR estimate in the days leading up to the reversal. RiXtrema method, on the other hand, clearly showed increasing risk about three months prior to the meltdown.
Australia Equity Drop in 1997
The examples we have given thus far all relate to the US equity risk, but our approach is quite general and we apply it to different markets. Here is one example from Australia. S&P BMI Australia index had a very rough October of 1997 when, after holding up rather well for a while, it lost nearly 15% as a result of the fallout from the Asian Currency Crisis. Exhibit 7 shows a comparison of the risk forecast methods in the period leading up to that event. As in all other examples we have seen, existing methods did not react until after the event. RiXtrema approach applied to Australia has produced some advance warning, despite low observed volatility. The 99% VaR measure calculated by RiXtrema increased from about 2.3 to about 4 during the month and a half leading up to the crisis.
Exhibit 7 -Comparison of risk forecasts in Australia during the Asian 1997 Crisis
Profiting From the Boom
While early warning should be a critical objective for risk models, it is important that financial firms put themselves in a position to benefit from the boom and not be permanently braced for crisis We do not view these false alarms as failures of the model; rather they represent "tests of the bubble", as discussed by Soros (1987) . The only way to distinguish a burst of the bubble from a "test" is ex post, at the time they appear indistinguishable.
There is one point that is worth discussing in more detail, namely the market decline during the 2001-2002 period, which was missed by all models. No 'early warning' was provided by the RiXtrema model regarding this downturn. The endogenous risk metrics used in our model did not show any significant potential for a crisis after the dot-com meltdown. One important lesson is that no model is perfect and that RiXtrema models will miss some drops in the market, when our risk pricing framework does not forecast high crash potential. It could also be said (though not proven) that subsequent events may have borne out the assessment made by the model, because the declines have not persisted and were followed by new highs. This is why we subjectively call it a 'test of the bubble' 6 on the graph.
Exhibit 8 -Profiting from the boom leading up to the 2008 Crash
Currency Risk in South Korea during 1997 and 2008
It has been our contention during the past year, that currency and sovereign debt are the key risks facing the investors over the foreseeable future. RiXtrema models cover a wide variety of asset classes.
In order to properly model endogenous risks of various segments such as equity, fixed income, currency or real estate, we have developed specific models of endogenous instability for each market. Currency risk models, in addition to using history of exchange rates, also use variety of variables to assess the pricing of currency risk in a particular country or region by international investors. These metrics are set in a boom-bust currency model and can override the actual volatility, if the risk is severely mispriced and the mispricing correction looks to be in the works. The examples of only some of the currency risk metrics that we use are various transformations of such indicators as: debt scaled by exports, short-term capital inflows scaled by GPD, sovereign spreads and real exchange rates, see Goldstein et al (2000) . These are then used to override and adjust the risk forecast coming from a traditional MPT based model. It is important to note, that our approach is not a simple inclusion of additional metrics into the regression equation, as is done in an Arbitrage Pricing Theory type models, see Ross (1976) . Instead, we have a number of separate models, which are used as 'early warning' indicators to override the old paradigm forecast when necessary and warn the investor of the potential endogenous risk. Exhibit 10 shows the latest Korean Currency Crisis. RiXtrema model again gave plenty of advance warning of the endogenous risk buildup for Korea. This vulnerability was exposed by the burst of the worldwide housing bubble.
Advantages and Limitations of RiXtrema Models
RiXtrema customized risk models provide unparalleled quality of 'early warning' signaling for use by risk managers and anyone concerned with a risk-return tradeoff, which includes everyone making investment choices. It is important, however, to be aware of limitations and potential misuse of any tool used for any purpose.
A. Black Swans and Exogenous Shocks
RiXtrema models are 'early warning' systems not based on the old paradigm of risk modeling which simply reflects the observed volatility. They are designed to quantitatively measure endogenous risks whitepaper, we are unable to see when the spike in the RiXtrema risk forecast occurred. Qualitatively, based on the data that is available and our knowledge of the situation, we can approximate that the risk estimate would have started increasing in December of 1995 and showing high levels of risk in mid-1996. and transform those measurements using advanced mathematical statistics into estimates of future probability distributions. This raises an important conceptual question of whether much discussed Black Swan events fall under the purview of such forecasting. To answer this, we must remember that true Black Swans are a complete surprise to everyone by their very definition, given by Taleb (2000) . The issue is, and it can be quite confusing, that true Black Swan events and events caused by endogenous risk are usually not the same. Endogenous risk events can frequently (but not always) be forecasted, which has been repeatedly proven by a small, but definitely non-trivial number of experts and by the charts that we have shown in this paper. But there is always the possibility of exogenous risk events i.e. risk events that are not stemming from systemic vulnerability. No model could have ever forecast the 9/11 attacks or the Gulf Oil Spill.
B. Forecast vs. Timing
What does it mean to predict or to forecast? This is a far more complicated topic than most people assume. It is outside of the scope of this article to comprehensively discuss it 8 , but a brief digression will be helpful. A dictionary tells us that 'to predict' means:
"to declare or indicate in advance; especially: foretell on the basis of observation, experience, or scientific reason". Does this necessarily mean something like: "A Korean Won is going to crash on November 14, 1997 "?. Some critics, who argue that risk forecasting is inherently impossible, argue against specifically this type of forecasting of the timing and even of the triggering event (i.e. "A Korean Won is going to crash on November 14, 1997 as a result of the major Asian Crisis which will start with Thailand's letting go of its dollar peg"). That is obviously absurd. After all, if someone knew something like that with any reasonable precision, why would they share this information? However, this straw man of an argument is not the only position of those who, like RiXtrema, are dedicating their research and their skills to risk forecasting. Risk forecasting is about measuring the endogenous crash potential of a market, not about predicting any specific timing and certainly not about the identification of the trigger that might cause the avalanche to start. It is not like our models could have estimated the probability of a "Lehman Collapse" in the run up to the 2008 Crash. Instead, they were based on a conception of financial markets as endogenous risk generating systems and successfully used various methods to assess that very risk. Different sets of metrics grounded in a proper framework clearly showed increased endogenous risk in a number of markets as early as summer of 2007. To summarize, on the basis of the proper conception of financial markets and of economic boom-bust sequences, we create cutting edge risk models which measure endogenous risk and assess chances of a major reversal due to such risk. As one can easily see from the charts, an 'early warning' can occur one year or three months before the event, but is always manifested by a sharp rise in a risk forecast relative to the standard model. The model cannot possibly predict timing or sequence of the event, only that the systemic risk is high in some or all markets being modeled.
C. Place of a RiXtrema Model in an Investment Process
Our team helps RiXtrema clients properly integrate our customizable risk models in a well structured risk process. This can be done with standard support or with executive risk consulting depending on the needs. A couple of general and very straightforward points regarding the use of the models are worth mentioning: -No risk model can ever replace a well structured risk process. Our models can serve as a catalyst for risk discussions and as a backbone of a risk process, but cannot replace that process. Future is inherently uncertain and not even the best possible estimation of systemic risks will ever change that fact.
-We do not recommend using a RiXtrema risk model, or any model, as a black box that automatically triggers trades. RiXtrema models provide an impetus and topics for regular risk meetings between decision makers. A sharp change in a risk forecast should trigger a serious discussion, but not be acted on automatically by robots.
-Precision does not matter. Models will naturally have some fluctuations. A question frequently arises about whether there exists a precise point where a fluctuation turns into 'early warning'. The first part of the answer to this question is to use common sense. All of the visual examples of 'early warning' we have provided showed twofold or bigger increase in the risk estimate somewhere within one year of the crisis. There is nothing magical about a twofold increase; any large increase should trigger discussions regarding the meaning of this signal and whether anything needs to be done about it. The second part of the answer is to compare the RiXtrema reading to a DTW type model to see whether our approach is at odds with how market is pricing risks at the moment. To facilitate such comparisons our models also provide the DTW type forecast in addition to the RiXtrema risk forecast.
Conclusions
We have discussed the root of the problems with much of today's risk management. Exhibits shown have provided a great deal of visual evidence from completely different periods and different markets confirming that our conception of the financial marketplace has outperformed the old paradigm of risk management. It is crucial for a thorough investigation to always examine statistical evidence and put the model through rigorous statistical testing. Stringent empirical work is at the core of all research work done at RiXtrema. In addition to visual testing, we performed detailed Basel (1996) VaR binomial tests as well as Kupiec's Likelihood Ratio VaR tests (1995) . Those tests were performed in different regions and asset classes of the global financial market over many thousands of observations 9 and confirm the visual results shown in the paper.
It is of great importance for practitioners of finance to be aware of our view that risk modeling must view the financial markets as endogenous risk generating systems and not simply reflect the current market mood. More so, the risk of extreme events has not decreased since the 2008 crash and subsequent partial recovery of the financial markets. Systemic risks have mutated and will continue to evolve in the next decade, which could very well eclipse the last decade of the 20 th century in a number and ferocity of extreme market events. Financial instability is here to stay, will you be prepared?
